Introduction
The economic valuation of changes in road safety, or fatality and injury risk in road transport, constitutes a key input to policymaking on how much to spend on road safety.
The monetary valuation of road safety is often referred to as the value of preventing a statistical fatality or the value of a statistical life (VSL). VSL is the population mean of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between wealth and mortality risk; that is, the monetary value of a "small" mortality risk change that aggregated over the population would amount to the prevention (or the increase) of one statistical death (Schelling 1968 , Mishan 1971 . Similarly, values of preventing injuries of different severity, can also be established (Jones-Lee 1974 , Jones-Lee et al. 1995 Hojman et al. 2005 ).
An extensive literature exists regarding the economic valuation of preventing fatalities and injuries (Viscusi and Aldy 2003, Rizzi and Ortuzar 2006; Lindhjem et al. 2011) . Most studies have applied stated preference (SP) methods (Carson and Louviere 2011 ) that have their theoretical underpinning in standard neo-classical economic theory.
However, recent research has proposed fitting responses from discrete stated choice (SC) experiments to a value function proposed by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Thaler 1980 , see also Malul et al. 2013) , taking into account respondents' reference points in their valuation of choice attributes and allowing for asymmetric preferences. De Borger and Fosgerau (2008) applied SC data but only with trade-offs between travel time and money and tested for reference-dependent preferences. They found that "loss aversion plays an important role in explaining responses; moreover, participants were found to be more loss averse in the time dimension than in the cost dimension"; they also found "evidence of asymmetrically diminishing sensitivity" (p 101). Hjorth and Fosgerau (2012) present a similar SC study, also finding that the value function was consistent with prospect theory, exhibiting loss aversion for both travel time and cost. Ramjerdi et al. (2010) found the same evidence in the Norwegian Value of Time Study. Masiero and Hensher (2010) found that their Swiss SC data on freight transport were much better explained when allowing for asymmetric preferences, a steeper utility function for losses than for gains; and found that loss aversion was significant for all three attributes (punctuality, time and cost). Many of these empirical studies seem to give support for an asymmetric value function (and loss aversion) as proposed by prospect theory regarding travel time and travel cost. Evidence regarding road safety attributes is very limited.
To our knowledge, only Rizzi and Ortúzar (2003) presented a test for reference dependency and loss aversion involving road safety. They found only weak indication of differences between valuations of safety gains and safety losses. De Blaeij and van Vuuren (2003) presented a prospect theory approach to road safety valuation, analysing the form of the utility function for safety losses based on a very small pilot sample, but did not assess loss aversion. This paper contributes to the limited literature on reference dependency and loss aversion in discrete choice experiments involving road safety (or casualty risk) by utilizing a large dataset (Veisten et al. 2013) . The dataset is also rich in the sense that the reference levels are person specific, pivoted to an actual trip described by the respondent (while Rizzi and Ortúzar 2003 used a common "pseudo-reference point", ibid, p. 17).
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: The next section presents some relevant theory regarding value functions. The third section describes the survey, the design of the choice experiments (CE), and the loss aversion hypothesis applicable to our data. The fourth section provides the results of our analysis. These results are discussed and conclusions drawn in the last section. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed an alternative value function to the one assumed in expected utility theory, the prospect theory-based value function which models the changes in utility level (i.e. marginal utility) associated with equal-sized losses and gains as asymmetric. More precisely, their value function was (1) defined in terms of changes from a reference point, (2) it was concave for gains and convex for losses (decreasing marginal values for gains and for losses), and (3) it was steeper for losses than for gains (loss aversion). (Kahneman and Tversky 1979") The functional form of such a value function can be rather simple. Departing from a linear and symmetric value function, = 0 + * , a modification to: = 0 + * + * , allows for more flexibility and would be consistent with prospect theory if:
Theoretical background
These three conditions correspond to the three characteristics described above (reference point ( ) dependent utility, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion). Hence, prospect theory implies that answers to valuation questions in SP surveys will depend on the reference point, which, in the case of safety would be the current level of safety. When asked about the compensation needed to offset a reduction in safety, the valuation function would be in the domain of losses and display loss aversion, which is akin to the so called endowment effect (Thaler 1980 , Bateman et al. 1997 . Prospect theory, proposing asymptotic preferences for road safety, adds an interesting psychological dimension to modelling human travel behaviour, compared to traditional neo-classical economic assumptions of preferences that are the same, in absolute terms, for gains and losses.
Prospect theory expands neo-classical theory by arguing for different preferences and mind-sets depending on the endowment, that is, the current level of road safety that the individual holds when facing a safety change component does not have to be strictly related to "real endowment" but can also apply to "mental endowment" (Ariely and Simonson 2003) . This latter aspect is important in our context as road users do not literally own/possess the existing level of road safety (see also the discussion in section 5).
Stated choice experiment design

Choices pivoted around reported reference trips
Preferences for road safety can be elicited by means of choice experiments. In our case, car drivers were asked to choose one of two route alternatives characterised by three different attributes: cost per trip, travel time per trip and casualties per year (for time and cost, the aggregate value per year was also given in parenthesis). daily traffic of about 6,000, as given from Table 2 . This is an example of "Choice 1" (of the 96 choice types specified in Table A1 , in the Appendix), whereby Alternative A has the reference level for all three attributes, while Alternative B has "slightly worse" levels for time and cost and "much better" level for casualties.")
The safety attribute was presented as the annual expected number of casualties on a road trip of a certain length on a road with a stated traffic volume (AADT). (Elvik 2008) .
From the reference levels of casualties, five attribute levels were defined (including the reference level), for every trip length / AADT class, according to Table 1 (Veisten et al. 2013) .
Table 1 about here
The other two attributes in the SC experiment were travel time and (out-of-pocket) trip cost, including fuel and possible toll costs (Ramjerdi et al. 2010) . A full-factorial design for a SC experiment with three attributes having five levels each would yield 5 3 =125 choice pairs; this was reduced to 96 choice pairs by removing cases with dominant alternatives and with the additional removal of some of the time level changes, following De Jong et al. (2007) . These 96 choice pairs were blocked into six choices per respondent, where the three attributes were related to trip alternatives in the pair-wise choice structure, plus an opt-out option. Doing so, one can identify 24 different choice tasks in terms of losses and gains relative to the references values (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
The reference values for the casualty attribute varied from two to 232 casualties, and about two thirds of the sample faced choices where the casualty reference value was in the range of two to eight; 40% of the reference levels were five or lower, 81% were lower or equal to 20, and only 4% of the observations had a reference value of more than 50 casualties.
Utility specification and hypothesis testing
In the following, only reference dependency for the casualty attribute is tested. In more complex models (not reported here), we simultaneously tested reference dependency for the cost and time attributes as well, 1 but as the general implication regarding the casualty attribute did not change we preferred more straightforward models assuming symmetric preferences for the time and cost attributes.
In the most general specification considered for this paper, the utility functions for the left hand-side alternative (LS) and the right hand-side (RS) alternative were specified as follows:
( 1 With a second hypothesis, we test whether the lambda terms (λ CAS_GAIN , λ CAS_LOSS ) are equal to one: H20:
We expect decreasing marginal returns (diminishing sensitivity for losses and gains), e.g.
values lower than 1, as implied by the sigmoid form (S-shaped form) proposed by prospect theory as illustrated in Figure 1 .
For hypothesis testing, we used the Likelihood ratio (LR) tests, i.e. statistical tests that compare the relative performance (in terms of goodness-of-fit as measured by the final log-likelihood statistic) of a model that is a restricted version of a more general model (Ortúzar and Willumsen, 2011, page 279 ).
In the case of models M2 and M1 we test for asymmetric preferences given linear value functions. If H10 is rejected at the 95% confidence level and if
we would conclude that loss aversion (given linear value functions) is present in our data. Testing M5 against M3 is the main test for asymmetric preferences in nonlinear value functions. As the marginal effect of losses and gains depends on both the beta and lambda terms in the nonlinear models, one cannot infer loss aversion from asymmetry based on the beta parameters only. Therefore, the test for loss aversion will be a LR test between M4 and M3 (i.e. assuming generic exponents for losses and gains). Then the conclusion about loss aversion will again be based on the LR test and the absolute size of the weights between losses and gains. Attempting to be on the safe side, we performed an additional LR-test between M5 and M4 to check if indeed generic exponents for losses and gains could be assumed.
On the other hand, a LR test between M3 and M1 tests H20. If H20 is rejected and if lambda is found to be lower than unity we can conclude that also diminishing sensitivity is present in our data set.
The survey
The survey, carried out during late April and the beginning of May, 2010, was administered by e-mail to an Internet panel of respondents maintained by a major polling firm in Norway. It was sent out in two waves and the survey item dealing with the valuation of changes in the number of seriously/severely injured and killed people (henceforth termed "casualties") going by car was part of the second wave. In this second wave 3,109 car drivers participating in the first wave were asked to participate in a safety valuation survey in a hypothetical route choice context; 75.33% completed this second wave of the survey, that is, 2,342 individuals (as the response rate to the first wave was about 22%, the effective response rate for the second wave of the survey can then be calculated as 75.33% of 22%, yielding about 16.5% of those invited to the first wave of the survey).
The respondents were invited to the second wave (just a week or so after responding to the first wave part) by an e-mail from the polling firm referring to their participation in the first wave. It was stated that the topic of the second wave was health, safety and security, and that it was not quite as comprehensive as the first wave survey part. The invited persons were also informed that their answers would contribute to transport policy and by their participation taking part in a draw for a prize (four travel gift tokens worth 10,000 Norwegian kroner each, or about 1250 Euro, applying the average exchange rate of 2010). The first two questions of the survey referred to the reference journey that they stated in relation to the first wave survey, asking if they remembered being asked about this journey and if it was correct that it was a journey by car on a date X with travel purpose Y, with travel time equal to #base_time# minutes and travel cost equal to #base_cost# Norwegian kroner. These questions were intended to assure a correct linkage from the first to the second wave, as well as reminding the respondents about their reported reference journey. The next questions before the CE introduced the issue of casualty risk, asking the respondents if they knew the number of fatalities in road accidents per year, describing different levels of injury severity and asking if they themselves had been injured in road accidents. The respondents were then asked about the traffic density on their reported itinerary, for the possibility of adjusting the annual average daily traffic, and then presenting the estimated annual casualty base level (#base_cost#) for their reference trip (see Table 2 ), asking if they thought it was about right, too high or too low.
After being asked about how many trips the respondents carried out on the itinerary of their reference trip, they were presented an introduction to the CE (shown in Figure 2 ) as described in Textbox 1. assigned to respondents, we cannot be certain that they internalized these values.
Presumably, a critical question relates to whether or not respondents regarded the assigned casualty reference levels as realistic. In Veisten et al. (2013, Table 3 ) the following figures were presented: 52% of the respondents perceived the assigned reference levels as "too high", while only 4% regarded them as "too low", and 35% stated that the assigned reference level seemed correct for the route they had driven. Investigating this a bit further, we found that the share considering the (calculated) reference as "too high" was highest for the shorter trip lengths with lower reference values (six casualties and below). Thus, e.g., five or six casualties annually on a short route were perceived as more unrealistic than 30-40 casualties on a longer route.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The final sample consisted of 2,290 respondents (52 respondents always choosing the "opt out" / "do not know" option, see Figure 2 , were deleted from analysis) and, with six choices per respondents this implies 13,740 choice observations. These include the cases where the "do-not-know" alternatives were chosen. Deleting the choice observations with "do-not-know" (which will be left out from statistical analysis in correspondence with
Veisten et al. 2013), yields 13,334 observations. towards choosing the least-casualty alternatives was apparently so strong that it drove respondents to select more losses than gains with respect to the travel time attribute. There were barely any differences between the shares of alternatives implying losses and gains in terms of costs As apparent from these descriptive statistics, it seems that the absolute number of casualties is the main driver in the observed choose behaviour, while the choice between reference value and non-reference value in itself seems to play only a minor role.
Estimation Results
We estimated both Multinomial logit (MNL) and error components mixed logit (ML) models (Ortúzar and Willumsen, 2011, Chapter 7) following the error specification chosen in Veisten et al. (2013) . As both models gave the same indications for the LR tests described above, we only present the MNL model results here as they are easier to interpret.
All respondents
In this section we estimate the model versions M1-M5 on the whole sample, i.e. regardless of whether the respondents perceived the casualty reference level as realistic or not (this is altered in the consecutive subsection). An indication of loss aversion can be seen from the fact that the coefficient for losses is greater (in absolute terms) than the coefficient for gains. In model 2 the estimated values are 0.399 versus 0.350 implying that losses are valued 14% higher than corresponding gains, while in model 4, the difference is 1.09 versus 0.989 implying that the losses are valued 10.2% higher than gains. In model 5 the difference is 1.08 versus 1.00, however here the relative impact of losses depends on the size of the losses/gains as the lambda values differ.
As indicated above, LR tests were performed to get formal statements about loss aversion. Interpreting M1 as a restricted version of M2, we calculated the LR-test statistic 2 The robust t-test statistics adjust partly for the repeated choices structure of the data by means of the 'Panel Data' section in BIOGEME (Bierlaire 2003) . Note that the robust-t-test statistics are not used for hypothesis test. As mentioned above the seldom selected "opt out" ("do not know") choices were discarded in all models.
to be 12.8. This is greater than 3.84 (the critical value for one degree of freedom -one restriction -at the 95% confidence level Notwithstanding, the hypothesis of constant rate of returns, H20: 
Segmentation of respondents according to whether or not the assigned reference value is perceived as realistic
As mentioned above only 35% of the respondents regarded the assigned casualty reference number as correct. An interesting analysis is whether the relative gap between the beta-coefficients for losses and gains differs between the subgroup finding the casualty reference correct (realistic) and the sub-group finding it unrealistic (mostly too high; and we also include the 9% answering "do not know" in this subgroup). One would presume that reference dependency (and loss aversion) is greater for those that perceive the reference value as realistic.
We therefore estimated model versions M1-M5 for both subgroups. Detailed results
(for the MNL model) are presented in Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix. As seen from those tables we obtained a result showing significant loss aversion for both subgroups, but still with some differences. Table 4 below summaries the %-gap between the weights for losses and gains (i.e. "the degree of loss aversion") for the two subgroups.
Table 4 about here
Clearly, the relative gap between the weights on losses and gains is higher for the subgroup that regards the reference value as realistic. For the linear model, the relative gap is almost double the size, while the difference between subgroups is somewhat less for the non-linear model.
Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we tested reference dependency, loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in a discrete choice experiment involving a road safety attribute. The results indicate that the respondents' valuation of changes in road safety fits well to the value-function proposed by prospect theory. Based on the data, we can depict a value function that has an S shape around the reference point, implying that respondents value losses in safety (i.e. an increased number of casualties) higher than gains (i.e. a reduced number of casualties), in absolute terms. This finding represents an important behavioural aspect of decision making and adds a psychological component to the utility maximization framework that is not represented in classical models with symmetric preferences.
Loss aversion regarding road safety can be motivated by conative costs of drivers related to giving up the level of road safety they are currently endowed with. Even though the road safety level does not constitute a real endowment one physically possess, our empirical evidence suggest that loss aversion is a significant factor in choice behaviour (at least in stated choice experiments). Thus, we believe that the concept of mental endowment (Ariely and Simonson 2003) is relevant in our application.
While loss aversion is found statistically significant, the degree of losses aversion is estimated to be relatively small, within the range of 8-19%. Descriptive statistics of choice behaviour (Table 2) indicate that reference dependency and loss aversion were only a secondary feature of the way respondents made their choices the stated choice experiments. Clearly, whether or not an alternative was the safest (regardless of the reference values) was the most crucial determinant of the choices made. This is especially true for respondents choosing lexicographically with respect to the safety attribute (about 37%). In spite of this, our LR test indicated that loss aversion is a significant feature of the value function for casualties in our data set. The LR test also indicated a strong case for diminishing sensitivity with rather low estimated exponents, yielding a strong convexity (concavity) for losses (gains).
The exact reference point for road safety is hard to obtain because respondents are -in general -not aware about road safety statistics (annual number of casualties) for the road they are driving on (and thus are not able to report a "correct" reference point). Our approach was to inform every respondent about their (presumed) current reference level (derived from aggregated statistics) before the start of the choice experiment. Of course, this level may be inaccurate and (even if accurate) differ from the respondent's perceived level; and indeed only 35% of respondents accepted the assigned reference level as being "correct". The degree of loss aversion for this subgroup was higher, with losses being valued around 19% higher than the corresponding gains for the linear model version (compared to 14% for the whole sample). This finding is expected under the hypothesis that there is indeed reference dependency in respondents' choice behaviour. Notably, we found also significant loss aversion for the subsample that did not perceive the reference value as realistic. It might be the case that respondents adapted to the assigned reference value even though it was (initially) perceived as too high or too low. The finding might however also indicate that some sort of mental accounting was done by some respondents, in a sense that they had a slight propensity to choose the alternative with the more familiar (more frequently appearing) attribute value (the reference value appeared in all six choice tasks while the two levels for losses and for gains appeared generally not more often than twice). Notwithstanding, the degree of loss aversion (estimated at 10%) was considerably lower for this subgroup. Psychologically this might be explained as follows: the negative feeling connected to giving up the "possession" (conative component) was not active for these respondents; they might not have felt (mentally) endowed with the assigned reference level of road safety.
The alternatives in our choice experiment involved deterministic attribute values and are, therefore, not applicable to estimate probability weighting functions as in the "cumulative prospect theory" approach (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). A possible direction of future research could be to design the road safety attribute in such a way that a probability distribution about possible outcomes (annual number of casualties) would be given in the choice experiments. Then, one could assign probabilities to losses and gains and could test (besides loss aversion) whether different weights would be given to small versus large probabilities.
Our discrete choice experimental data were analysed in parameter space, which has been the standard approach for stated choices, but they could alternatively have been analysed in willingness-to-pay (WTP) space, by modelling directly the ratio of the casualty parameter and the cost parameter (Train and Weeks 2005) . A difference between willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for road safety deterioration and WTP for safety improvement also follows from prospect theory. Thus, although analysing reference dependence and loss aversion in parameter space, we might assert that our results are consistent with findings from Guria et al. (1999) (gains) and deteriorations (losses), it will represent an overestimation of the value of a gain (WTP) and an underestimation of the value of (avoiding) a loss (WTA compensation).
The diminishing sensitivity, a decreasing marginal value for both gains and losses, can be considered, to some extent, as expected from standard economic theory (Rollins and Lyke 1998); but might be exaggerated in SP surveys, the so-called "insensitivity to scope" phenomena Mitchell 1993, Hammitt and Graham 1999) . The value function of prospect theory implies that the WTP for many small improvements in safety is larger than the WTP for an equivalent single large improvement. This follows from the concavity of the value function in the domain of gains. The implication from this non-linearity of the value function is that estimated unit values, e.g., related to the value of a statistical life, will depend on the size (scope) of the changes presented in SP studies. Thus, the size of the impact of a policy measure, in addition to the direction of the safety change, should be taken into account. 
